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Preface
Kant’s works on both theoretical and practical philosophy have been the focus of attention of
many scholars over the past two hundred years. Yet, when it comes to his moral philosophy,
there are some areas which have not been thoroughly discussed. This is probably due to the
general impression that his systematic vindications of religious faith stand in a sharp contrast
to Kant’s far more important historical role as the modern critic of traditional metaphysics.
The focus of this dissertation is hopefully the beginning of a project with the aim of
shedding light on some areas that have been left out of consideration, or at last treated with less
attention. These areas, I believe, are the roots of what has been already thoroughly studied. As
roots, however, these areas remain in the dark and are thus avoided.
The main aim of this thesis is to explore and discuss Kant’s central notion of rational
belief. Kant’s account of rational belief is the ground on which rational moral agents assent to
propositions that enable them to avoid any practical incoherence as they engage in their moral
duty.
In order to fully grasp this subtle notion, a close reading of the dialectic of pure practical
reason will be offered, in particular the doctrine of the postulates of practical reason.
In his doctrine of the postulates of practical reason, Kant argues that although there is
no theoretical proof for or against freedom, God, and the immortality of the soul, moral rational
agents ought to believe in their reality, as there are practical grounds to believe in them. The
need to introduce these practical postulates – being part of what Kant calls ‘practical cognition’
– is the necessity of a hypothesis that can and must be formed by the subject only from a
practical point of view and has nothing to do with a theoretical cognition of such hypotheses.
From this standpoint, not only could the postulates be viewed as a point of connection
between what Kant conceives of as the phenomenal world of spatio-temporal appearances and
the noumenal realm of things in themselves, but also as architectonic elements which – in their
connection to the concept of freedom – are part of what “constitutes the keystone of the whole
structure of a system of pure reason” (KpV, 5:3 f.) and thus also crucial for the conceivability
of the unity of the theoretical and practical use of reason in accomplishing the “highest vocation
of reason” (5:108), i.e. the actualization of the highest good.
As Kant establishes the limits of knowledge and reason in its theoretical use in the
Critique of Pure Reason, he also argues that the vocation of reason will be complete through
finding its (reason’s) ideas in their practical use.
In the third antinomy, Kant provides a thesis (of the anti-naturalist) which says that
causality in accordance with laws of nature is not the only causality from which the appearances
of the world can be derived. To explain these appearances, it is necessary to assume that there
is also another causality, that of spontaneity. While the (naturalist) antithesis says that: there
is no spontaneity; everything in the world takes place solely in accordance with laws of nature.
Whereas the antithesis is essential to the theoretical interest of reason, the thesis is
essential to its practical interest. Hence, with the third antinomy Kant reaches a stance from
which, on the one hand, freedom becomes conceivable, while, on the other hand, the unity of
reason is endangered by apparently conflicting interests.
Kant, however, attempts to show that this contradiction only arises as reason was led to
err in assuming it can have knowledge of its own ideas (like those of freedom, immortality, and
the existence of God). The solution for this error was the critique of reason to find the
boundaries it can set for itself in its theoretical use and to reinstate or find a place for such ideas
through the use of practical reason.
Kant announces that only through the use of practical reason, which has its own laws,
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can we extend our rational capacity and reach beyond the limits of sensuous experience, not on
the grounds of knowledge but on the grounds of morality and belief.
Practical reason fills the place theoretical reason left vacant after setting its limits, by
postulating reason’s ideas as practical postulates on the ground of morality, its law, and the
belief presupposed by its actualization and hence a unity of theoretical and practical rationality
could be established.
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Chapter 1
On the Distinction of Theoretical and Practical
Cognition
Thus I had to deny knowledge in order to make room for faith (KrV, B XXX)

In the B-Preface to the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant announces one central goal of his critical
project: "to deny knowledge in order to make room for faith" (B xxx).
At first glance, an announcement of this sort might seem strange or even confusing,
especially in a work focusing on the question of how (synthetic a priori) knowledge is possible.
Many questions can arise with a view on this quote: what is that knowledge which Kant has to
deny? And why so? Why does Kant need to make room for faith? And: Which kind of faith?
In the following section (and the coming chapters), I will attempt to provide answers
to these questions.
In the "Canon of Pure Reason," Kant contends that all "interest of reason" is united in
the following three questions:
“1. What can I know?
2. What ought I to do?
3. What may I hope?” (A 805/B 833)

The critical thematization of our rational capacity is divided between the first two questions.
The first one concerns the speculative, i.e. theoretical use of reason directed towards describing
what factually happens (and might be known by us by understanding it in its necessity by
relating it back to laws). The second question concerns the practical use of reason, which is
directed at prescribing what ought to happen (and, therefore, what we are obliged to do) by
determining the fundamental moral law directing all our actions. The third question concerns
claims regarding the consequences of doing what we ought to do. More specifically, we may
hope that our souls are immortal and that there is an author of nature.
In his First Critique, Kant draws the boundaries of knowledge or the limits of the
theoretical use of reason. He famously distinguishes between considering things as objects of
experience in cognition and considering the same things as things in themselves in pure thought
(B xxvi n.).
For sensuous rational beings like us, things are transcendentally constituted and thus
empirically “given” (A 50/B74), namely “given” as related to us and to each other within a
cognitive relation, i.e.: as “appearances” qua “indeterminate objects of a sensuous intuition”
(A 20/B 34). Such appearances, i.e., objects of possible experience, are to be conceptually
determined by the understanding (A 50/B 74 ff.), so as to be in the first place thought,
understood and cognitively related to as something (A 79/B 105):
“Appearances, to the extent that as objects they are thought in accordance with the unity
of the categories, are called phaenomena. If, however, I suppose there to be things that
are merely objects of the understanding and that, nevertheless, can be given to an
intuition, although not to sensible intuition (as coram intuiti intellectuali), then such
things would be called noumena (intelligibilia) (A 249).
Accordingly, we cannot cognize anything about the existence and nature of things considered
5

as things in themselves, i.e. as things considered independently of their being related to us
within a sensuous cognitive relation, but can rather only think such things (cf. A 249 ff., B 306
ff.) to be the logical ground of our phenomenal experience, inasmuch as we are not capable of
an intellectual cognition of these things, i.e. incapable of intellectually intuiting noumena.
“To cognize an object, it is required that I be able to prove its possibility (whether by
the testimony of experience from its actuality or a priori through reason). But I can
think whatever I like, as long as I do not contradict myself, i.e., as long as my concept
is a possible thought even if I cannot give any assurance whether or not there is a
corresponding object somewhere within the sum total of all possibilities. But in order
to ascribe objective validity to such a concept (real possibility, for the first sort of
possibility was merely logical) something more is required. This "more," however, need
not be sought in theoretical sources of cognition; it may also lie in practical ones.” (B
xxvi)
Accordingly, cognition depends on the real possibility of the object, or what Kant sometimes
calls ‘objective validity.’ This ‘objective validity’ or ‘real possibility’ is a property of a concept
to be instantiated in experience, however, as will become crucial to understand in detail, is not
only brought about by a theoretical proof of its possibility (which is either inferential or
perceptual), but also by a practical proof of its possibility. While thought depends on the mere
logical possibility of the object.
We shall soon explain how cognition occurs in detail and the role of each of the faculties
responsible for its occurrence, i.e., the faculty of sensibility and understanding.
Kant, however, recognizes reason as a distinctive faculty, which he calls the faculty of
principles (A299/B355). Reason generates the metaphysical ideas of God, freedom, and
immortality which we can conceive without, however, having the capacity to cognize and relate
to them as objects of sensuous experience. The knowledge of such ideas therefore is denied for
speculative reason.
“Now after speculative reason has been denied all advance in this field of the supersensible,
what still remains for us is to try whether there are not data in reason's practical data for
determining that transcendent rational concept of the unconditioned, in such a way as to reach
beyond the boundaries of all possible experience, in accordance with the wishes of metaphysics,
cognitions a priori that are possible, but only from a practical standpoint. By such procedures
speculative reason has at least made room for such an extension, even if it had to leave it empty;
and we remain at liberty, indeed we are called upon by reason to fill it if we can through
practical data of reason.” (B xxi)

Although Kant clearly declares that we cannot claim any knowledge of the supersensible
metaphysical ideas of freedom, God, and the soul, he is also unmistakably clear about his
intention not to dismiss such ideas. Thus, instead of proceeding dogmatically and attempting
to address questions about possible knowledge of them, Kant wants these ideas to be
"constructed according to the critique of pure reason" (B xxx). This critique, as Kant explains,
demonstrates that theoretical reason cannot cognize the unconditioned; however, practical
reason might still have ways to be considered from which a practical cognition of the
unconditioned may be attempted.
This practical cognition, however, will not be of objects that we can know, but rather
that we have a legitimate rational need to assume the existence of (cf. KpV, 5:143). In other
words, practical reason postulates that God, freedom, and the soul exist because it (practical
6

reason) demands their existence.
Hence, according to Kant, only through the use of practical reason, which has its own
laws, can we extend our rational capacity and reach beyond the limits of experience, not on the
grounds of knowledge but on the grounds of morality and belief.
“Pure practical reason now fills this vacant place with a determinate law of causality in
an intelligible world (with freedom), namely the moral law” (5:49)
Through addressing our role within the world as moral agents, Kant conceives of the three
metaphysical ideas of the existence of God, the freedom of the will, and the immortality of the
soul as practical postulates. The validity of such ideas will not be proven empirically, as they
are beyond the limits of experience and, therefore, of knowledge. However, practical reason
will postulate them in this "vacant place" beyond the limits of knowledge on the ground of
morality, its law and the faith presupposed by its actualization.
In the next step, we shall now analyze in more detail how Kant differentiates between
the components of theoretical and practical cognition.
1.

Theoretical Cognition

Experience for us as rational sensuous beings is possible only as a composition of two
capacities or powers of the mind, namely sensibility and understanding. Both capacities
contribute to producing representations. The first requires an external prompt for this purpose,
while the second supplies the faculty of knowledge with representations from itself. Knowledge
for Kant then, is a combination of being affected by something that is received and thus, as
such, is not produced by the mind; and by something that is contributed by the inner workings
of the mind and thus is ‘spontaneous’, i.e. of originating from the mind’s own initiative and
mode of operation.
In the First Critique, Kant determines cognition (Erkenntnis) as a type of representation
by differentiating it from sensation. Whereas sensations refer to “the subject as a modification
of its state”, cognitions are objective perceptions that refer to an object immediately or
mediately (A320/B376). Although this quasi-definition reflects the most general meaning of
the term, Kant uses it loosely in other places. Sometimes, he refers to different degrees of
cognitions (Jäsche Logik, 9:64- 65; A 573/B 601). However, all the definitions, conditions, and
degrees of cognition share the conceptual mark that the notion involves the representation of
something.
“The genus is representation in general (representatio). Under it stand representations with
consciousness (perceptio). A perception [Wahrnehmung] that refers to the subject as a
modification of its state is a sensation (sensatio); an objective perception is a cognition
(cognitio). The latter is either an intuition or a concept (intuitus vel conceptus). The former is
immediately related to the object and is singular; the latter is mediate, by means of a mark,
which can be common to several things. A concept is either an empirical or a pure concept,
and the pure concept, insofar as it has its origin solely in the understanding (not in a pure image
of sensibility), is called notio. A concept made up of notions, which goes beyond the possibility
of experience, is an idea or a concept of reason.” (A 320/B 376 f.).

The previous famous passage from the “Transcendental Dialectic” of the Critique of Pure
Reason is considered one of the very few places where Kant unravels a number of technical
terms related to cognition and lays down their relation to each other. Kant says that the genus
representation contains sensations, intuitions, and concepts. Sensibility, the faculty that
7

provides sensory representations, generates representations when being affected by the object,
namely as a response to the affection by the object. On the other hand, we have the faculty of
understanding, which generates conceptual representations spontaneously – i.e., without the
need for affection. Reason, however, is that spontaneous faculty which in inferential processes
of reasoning generates representations (certain concepts and principles concerning totalities,
(A299/B355), which Kant calls 'ideas' or 'notions' and which are irreducible to the
representations of sensibility and the understanding. These ideas, as we shall see, are, the ideas
of God, the world-whole, and the soul.
Each faculty (Vermögen) or “source” of our representations, i.e., sensibility, the
understanding and reason, play a distinct role in the generation and systematization of
theoretical cognition. Let us, however, focus on the generation of knowledge for the moment:
“Our cognition arises from two fundamental sources in the mind, the first of which is the
reception of representations (the receptivity of impressions), the second the faculty for
cognizing an object by means of these representations (spontaneity of concepts); through the
former an object is given to us, through the latter it is thought in relation to that representation
(as a mere determination of the mind). Intuition and concepts therefore constitute the elements
of all our cognition, so that neither concepts without intuition corresponding to them in some
way nor intuition without concepts can yield a cognition. (…) It comes along with our nature
that intuition can never be other than sensible, i.e., that it contains only the way in which we
are affected by objects. (…) Without sensibility no object would be given to us, and without
understanding, none would be thought. Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without
concepts are blind. It is thus just as necessary to make the mind's concepts sensible (i.e., to add
an object to them in intuition) as it is to make its intuitions understandable (i.e., to bring them
under concepts)." (A50/B74 f.; cf. A15/B29; B 146; RP 20:296, 325)

Starting with sensibility, when an object is given to us through affection, (A 19/B 33), it
becomes the matter of a conscious representation for the subject. This affection is a prerequisite
for the production of a representation that stands in a cognitive relation to the object. Kant calls
such representations through which the mind relates immediately to objects intuitions. He
distinguishes between the form and the matter of such representations. For the objects of
intuition are given to us through two forms of relating sensuous impressions (the matter of
intuition) in temporal and spatial relations: Space and time, being forms of intuiting (the acts),
intuition (the representations) and receptivity (the mode of mental operativity) (A 20/B 34).
The immediacy of sensible intuitions means there is no other representation mediating
between thing and intuition. It refers to its object directly. In this sense the affection is that
which functions as the material condition of the intuition’s referring to its object.
The forms of the intuition, on the other hand, “grounds the validity of a set of
determinate a priori principles for experience.”1 This is so because we, as rational sensuous
subjects, can only differentiate objects from ourselves and intuit them by sensing their matter
as being related in spatio-temporal relations. Therefore, these forms are considered a priori
principles that can determine any experience.
Similar to the faculty of sensibility, Kant introduces the faculty of the understanding in
the narrow sense in terms of its function, as the faculty in charge of producing spontaneous
representations or as the "active or spontaneous faculty through which objects are thought, or
determined, by concepts in judgments."2 He contends that the understanding spontaneously
functions in relation to the sensual perceptions in accordance with the twelve categories that he
introduced. These categories are the basic rules of the understanding, and they reside in our
1

Kain (2010), p. 214.

2

Watkins and Willaschek (2010), p. 95.
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minds as part of the necessary structure of a representational system that does not produce but
thinks the objects given to in intuition. Hence, they are pure a priori concepts that are not
derived from experience.
“[T]he combination (conjunctio) of a manifold in general can never come to us through the
senses and therefore cannot already be contained in the pure form of sensible intuition; for it is
in an act of spontaneity of the power of representation; and since one must call the latter
understanding, in distinction from sensibility, all combination, whether we are conscious of it
or not, whether it is a combination of the manifold of the intuition or of several concepts, and
in the first case either of sensible or non-sensible intuition, is an action of understanding, which
we would designate of the general title synthesis, in order at the same time to draw attention to
the fact that we can represent nothing as combined in the object without having previously
combined it ourselves and that among all representations combination is the only one that is
not given through objects but can be only executed by the subject itself since it is an act of its
self-activity (B 129-30).

In the previous quote, Kant claims that there must be a reason for the relatedness of the
representations and how we receive them as unified manifolds, for this unity does not come to
us through the senses. Therefore, sensibility is not capapble of acting as the ground of
possibility of the combination of manifolds. For Kant, this act of synthesizing the
representations given to us in intuition must be a “spontaneous” act, which the subject itself
quasi autonomously (sua sponte: out of its own initiative, thus not prompted by something else)
produces (in accordance with the principles of the pure understanding). This capacity to
combine the manifold in general is the categoriological form of the apriori of the understanding
(B 146).
Hence, sensuous intuitions and spontaneous conceptual representations entertain
different relationships with the object and the subject. Whereas both are independent of the
matter of experience as to their form. Sensuous representations are constrained by matter of
experience as to their contents, for the matter of experience causes them by causing a sensation
in the subject. While spontaneous conceptual representations are not constrained by the matter
of experience as to their contents, for they are not caused by the former but rather produced by
the subject. To one and the same object of thought, potentially, an infinity of concepts applies.
We are thus free in our formation of concepts, but not in our formation of intuitions, as the
latter are completely determined by the object.
From this brief sketch, it is evident that for theoretical cognition to be possible, and
more broadly for knowledge and systematized knowledge (science), it is necessary to refer
representations to objects that are given and for these representations to be valid (i.e. capable
of being true or false) of these objects to which they refer.“All of our cognition is in the end
related to possible intuitions: for through these alone is an object given. Now an a priori
concept (a nonempirical concept) either already contains a pure intuition in itself, in which case
it can be constructed; or else it contains nothing but the synthesis of possible intuitions, which
are not given a priori, in which case one can well judge synthetically and a priori by its means,
but only discursively, in accordance with concepts, and never intuitively through the
construction of the concept.” (A 720/ B 748)
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2. Practical Cognition
The understanding (in its broader sense comprising reason) is, as suggested earlier, not merely
concerned with conceptually determining empirical objects, but it is also concerned with
determining the grounds of the will. In the latter case, human reason follows, or rather: ought
to follow the a priori objective principle of rational willing, namely the Categorical Imperative.
Theoretical cognition is the cognition of “what exists”, whereas practical cognition is
the cognition of “what ought to exist” (A 633/B 661, emphasis deleted). The auxiliary verb
‘ought’ expresses the practical necessity of the action, but in referring to ‘necessity’ we are
here not talking about the physical necessity of efficient causality; rather, we refer to a
necessity, the source of which is the compelling nature of reason itself. We thus refer to a
rational causality. Kant agrees with the traditionalist view that an act could be viewed as
rational insofar as it is good; however, for Kant, an action is not rational because it is good; it
is good because it is rational (GMS, 4:413).
The capacity to engage in practical reasoning is only available to beings who have a
will. A will is a capacity to act in accordance with principles (representations of laws) (4:412).
These principles are objective principles (4:414) that all of our ordinary moral judgments ought
to be based on. Such judgments are supposed to be accepted by any rational being upon rational
reflection. Therefore, having a will means that we are aware we have rational constraints or
laws that we should act upon, whether or not we choose to act in accordance with them.
The uncertainty regarding the conformity to the principles of reason is because human
beings are not only rational beings; they are also sensible beings who have natural inclinations
or subjective incentives. Therefore, a human will does not always subjectively will what is
objectively necessitated by reason. What necessitates this imperfect will to act in accordance
with laws is the thought that we are morally required to do so, even if we might not want to.
“The representation of an objective principle, insofar as it is necessitating for a will, is called a
command (of reason), and the formula of the command is called an imperative (4:413).
Kant distinguishes between imperatives which our actions conform to only as means
to achieving something else; he calls those hypothetical, and those which represent an action
as objectively necessary of itself and without reference to any other end, and calls them
categorical (4:414).
Moreover, the determining grounds for the hypothetical imperatives can be either
pathological (empirical), i.e. originating from particular desires or inclinations, or pure (nonempirical). If the determining ground of a will is pure, then the act is moral; not because of its
specific purpose, end, or intention – to all of which Kant refers as "the matter of the maxim"
(5:34) – but because of the form of its maxim (its generality or universality, according to the
Categorical Imperative). A maxim, however, is a subjective rule or principle of action
according to which the will is determined, thus broadly corresponding to what in normal
parlance is referred to as an ‘agent’s intention’.
Due to the formal nature of the Categorical Imperative, there must be a single universal
one, and only this categorical imperative of morality concerns all rational beings. For the other
imperatives differ according to their universality and normative status; for example, what
makes people happy will differ from one person to another at different times.
The Categorical imperative or the supreme principle of morality is then the objective,
rationally necessary, and unconditional principle that we, as rational beings, must follow
despite any natural inclinations we may have to the contrary. This principle, according to Kant,
can justify all the specific moral requirements; this is also to say that all immoral actions are
irrational because they violate the Categorical Imperative.
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3. The Primary Distinction between Theoretical and Practical Cognition
While we have seen Kant comparing theoretical and practical cognition in several perspectives,
he draws the following crucial distinction in a passage of the B-Introduction to the First
Critique:
“Insofar as there is to be reason in these sciences, something in them must be cognized a priori,
and this cognition can relate to its object in either of two ways, either merely determining the
object and its concept (which must be given from elsewhere), or else also making the object
actual. The former is theoretical, the latter practical cognition of reason.” (B x)

In this passage, Kant establishes the two ways through which cognition, most generally
speaking, could relate to its object and, by doing so, he differentiates two kinds of cognition,
namely theoretical and practical. Every cognition, generally speaking, determines the object
and its concepts. By this, Kant means that something needs to be added to the concept of the
subject that enlarges it (A 598/B 626). This suggests all cognition presupposes a concept of its
object, which it determines by synthetically judging it according to the principle of its
determination.
Nevertheless, theoretical cognition and practical cognition are distinguished mainly in
relation to the existence or actuality of the object they relate to. As we have seen earlier, our
theoretical knowledge depends on the object being given to us from elsewhere (in intuition)
through the senses and their affecting the mind; and we can never have any affection of the
mind, and consequently, no theoretical cognition, if this object did not exist or were not actual,
or at least the object of a possible experience.
On the other hand, practical cognition does not begin from sensible data, and their
objects are certainly not given in intuition. Hence, S. Engstrom argues that it does not only
produce the form of its object but also produces its existence.3
Speaking of ‘producing the form of the object’ is Engstrom’s way of explaining what
Kant means by saying that cognition, be it empirical or a priori, determines its object and
concepts logically. Engstrom contends that although Kant clearly says that a representation
cannot produce its object in respect to its existence, Kant was also clear when he says that
“[t]he representation is still determinant of the object a priori if it is possible through it alone
to cognize something as an object”(A 92/B 125), which for Engstrom suggests it can actually
produce the form of this object.
Moreover, saying that a representation can determine the object a priori may suggest
that it could also determine the object empirically, that is to say, that cognition determines its
object only under empirical conditions, empirical intuition, or the possibility of a direct
perceptual encounter with the object it determines.
On the other hand, to say that practical cognition produces the object’s existence does
not equate it with intellectual intuition, or divine cognition. The first starts from concepts or
general representations of the general description of an intended state, unlike the latter, which
proceeds from single representation or intuitions of individual entities. In addition, the object
of practical cognition is consists in an actualization operating on given matter and certainly not
ex nihilo, while in the case of intellectual intuition, there is no matter needed for the production
to be possible.
The difference in the object-relation between theoretical and practical cognition could
be even traced back to the difference in the nature of the object of each (KpV, 5:57). We will
come back to this later on, but for our purpose now, we can say that the most distinctive
3

Engstrom (2002), pp. 59 ff.
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characteristic between theoretical and practical reason is that the first depends on the actuality
or the existence of its object, while the latter makes the actuality of the object possible by
acting, i.e. by actualizing an intention that – qua general – is logico-conceptual in nature.
At the beginning of the section on the “Canon of Pure Reason”, Kant in the First
Critique basically declares that the whole point of reason lies in the practical or moral use. He
also explains how the theoretical project is supposed to fit in or rather lead up to and find its
completion in that of practical philosophy:
“It is humiliating for human reason that it accomplishes nothing in its pure use, and even
requires a discipline to check its extravagances and avoid the deceptions that come from them
(...). The greatest and perhaps only utility of all philosophy of pure reason is thus only negative
(...). Nevertheless, there must somewhere be a source of positive cognitions that belongs in the
domain of pure reason, and that perhaps give occasion for errors only through
misunderstanding, but that in fact constitute the goal of the strenuous effort of reason. For to
what cause should the unquenchable desire to find a firm footing beyond all bounds of
experience otherwise be ascribed? Pure reason has a presentiment of objects of great interest to
it. It takes the path of mere speculation in order to come closer to these; but they flee before it.
Presumably, it may hope for better luck on the only path that still remains to it, namely that of
its practical use.” (A 796/B 824).

For Kant, something is missing in discussing pure reason and theoretical cognition,
unless we engage with the practical use of reason. Reason has been striving to comprehend its
own ideas (like those of freedom, immortality, and the existence of God), though never been
succeeding in grasping them and was thus led to err and believe it can have knowledge of them
until it could find the boundaries it can set for itself in its theoretical use. However, there is
hope to complete the vocation of reason in finding these ideas in their practical use to achieve
“the final aim of reason in its transcendental use” (A 798/B 826).
Following Kant's footsteps, the completion of the ideas, concerning practical reason
and practical cognition, adumbrated here will take place in the next two chapters. We will
present Kant’s claims that practical reason could have practical cognition of the moral law and
freedom (AA 5:4) and how this cognition grounds the rational belief in the existence of God
and the immortality of the soul, to better understand how Kant reinstates or finds a place for
such ideas within his critical system of reason.
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Chapter 2

Navigating Kant’s Second Critique
2.1 «The Critique of Practical Reason»:
General Purpose, Importance, and Relations to Other Works
Arguably, Kant laid out most of his ideas on moral theory in his first book on this matter,
namely, in The Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (GMS, 1785). That is why it is
sometimes questionable why he had to write a second critique. In this first section of this
chapter, we will attempt to answer this question by showing the purpose and relationships of
the Second Critique (KpV, 1786) to GMS, and finally to The Metaphysics of Morals (MdS,
1797), being the last work Kant devoted to Ethics.
While the Critique of Practical Reason is (supposed to be) presenting Kant's moral
theory, it also deals with two other main questions, namely, the freedom of the will, which was
thoroughly discussed in The Groundwork (Groundwork III), and the doctrine of the postulates
of practical reason, through which practical reason provides grounds for assuming the
metaphysical ideas of the existence of God and the immortality of the soul, which Kant declared
could not be established through theoretical reason. It might be clear then that the book
establishes some essential connections between themes earlier discussed in both GMS and the
First Critique, or in other words, between Kant's epistemological/metaphysical systems and his
moral theory.
Since the Critique of Practical Reason plays such an essential role, we might need to
inquire into/ reconstruct its primary purpose, as Kant articulated it. In the “Preface” and the
“Introduction”, Kant declares multiple aims for this work; the most general aim, however,
consists in “show[ing] that there is pure practical reason” by “criticiz[ing] reason’s entire
practical faculty” (both pure and empirical) (5:3).
We shall now very briefly discuss some thematic overlaps and differences between the
three major works of Kant’s moral philosophy.
The Groundwork basically connects Freedom with morality and establishes the
relationship between rational agency and Freedom. The work’s main aim is to establish the
validity of the moral law and connect it to the conception of freedom (4:454). He presents an
analysis of the concept of duty which leads to announcing the basic principle of duty.
Moreover, in the third section of the book (GMS III), Kant provides a "deduction" of the
validity of the moral law. With this deduction, Kant attempts to say that it is entirely rational
to accept the moral law as our fundamental principle of action by deriving it from a conception
of Freedom that we are allowed to attribute to ourselves on the grounds that are independent of
morality.
In the Second Critique, however, Kant, arguably, states that the moral law does not need
or allow for a deduction, for its authority is already given through the fact of pure reason.
That is our immediate consciousness of the moral law as the authoritative law (5:31).
"However, in order to avoid misinterpretation in regarding this law as given, it must be noted
carefully that it is not an empirical fact but the sole fact of pure reason which, by it, announces
itself as originally lawgiving (sic volo, sic jubeo)"(5:3). By doing so, Kant announces that the
moral law cannot be grounded in anything outside of our ordinary moral consciousness.
To complete this brief discussion about the trilogy, unlike the case with the Groundwork
and the Critique of Practical Reason, in which Kant dealt with the pure principles of morals
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and tried to elucidate these basic principles in the abstract form, the examination of the
Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals, takes the form of applying these
principles. As Kant does also deduce duties from the Categrical Imperative in the GMS, one
might also say that in the GMS Kant shows how the Categrical Imperative functions as the
foundation of a doctrine of duty and doctrine of right.
The work involves a doctrine of virtues and vices and the foundations of law and rights.
The book is divided into two main books; the Doctrine of Right, which deals with the rights
that people have or can acquire, and the Doctrine of Virtue, which deals with the virtues they
ought to acquire. In other words, even if it is concerned with the same moral principles, in the
Metaphysics of Morals, Kant applies these principles in the concrete.
Kant did not initially plan for a Second Critique. He added a remark in the Groundwork
saying that there is no pressing need to have a critique of practical reason, as it does not require
a critical examination. Unlike theoretical reason, practical reason can be easily brought "to a
high degree of correctness and precision” and that the Groundwork is sufficient for this purpose
as a preparatory work (GMS, 4:391). He also introduces a third section in the Groundwork that
announces the “Transition from Metaphysics of Morals to the Critique of Pure Practical
Reason”, which was believed to suffice for this purpose, and in the Second Critique itself, Kant
mentions that he is going to reply to some criticisms of the Groundwork (KpV, 5:6-7).
Based on the above, a legitimate question might come to mind: what made Kant decide
to publish the Second Critique as a self-standing book and not as an appendix to the second
edition of the First Critique, as was initially planned, if all he cared about was to reply to his
critics? The answer to this question might give us some sense of the systematic purpose and
importance of this book for Kant and his critical project as a whole.
In his paper "The Origin and the Aim of the Critique", Heiner F. Klemme argues that the
discovery of an 'antinomy of practical reason' was what induced Kant to write a separate
critique of practical reason and that this dialectical problem is what really distinguishes the
Second Critique from the Groundwork. Unlike Allen Wood, and many who join him in
believing that the second critique was only written for pragmatic or technical reasons as a
defense to criticisms concerning arguments of the First Critique and the Groundwork4, Klemme
contends that the discovery of an 'antinomy of practical reason' reflected a new development
which, therefore, is not discussed in any of Kant's previous work and thus also redirects our
attention to understand the aim of the Critique of Practical Reason primarily through the
“Dialectic of pure practical reason”, without, however, disregarding the “Analytic of pure
practical reason”.
Whereas Kant in the “Analytic” claims that the moral law is given to us as a fact (5:31),
he raises suspicions about this fact in that section of the “Dialectic” entitled “The Antinomy of
practical reason” and puts this fact in question, as Klemme explains:
“This suspicion of an antinomy obviously suits Kant because only thus can he assign the criticism
of the validity of the categorical imperative a place within the system of pure reason, and at the
same time prove that this criticism is unfounded. As he had already done in the Critique of Pure
Reason, Kant searches for the 'rational' occasion of our doubts about the reality of pure reason in
the Critique of Practical Reason as well. Whether he was able to remove it remains debatable in
view of the tension discussed.”5

The resolution of this intentionally raised suspicion then might be of great importance, not only
because it might include the answer to the question why Kant had to write a Second Critique,
4

Wood (1970), p. 26.

5

Klemme (2010), p. 30.
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but also because it might provide an answer to the question how parts of Kant’s system before
1790 could be connected.
From this brief discussion, it should be clear that the answer to many questions
concerning the role of the Second Critique within Kant's whole project, its aim, as well as its
relationship to the other works on moral philosophy, particularly the Groundwork and the First
Critique, is still not clear. Accordingly, in the following section, we will attempt to provide a
detailed analysis of how each part of the text of the Critique of Practical Reason is (or is not)
in harmony with all other parts and how the systematically more fundamental parts connect to
form the unity of the whole work. Only then the aim of the whole work will become apparent,
thus granting us an outlook on its role in the context of Kant's critical project as a whole.
2.2 The Compositional Structure of The Critique of Practical Reason
Kant's organizational structure in the Critique of Practical Reason is similar to that of the
Critique of Pure Reason and the Critique of Judgment. Like any Kantian critique, therefore,
the Second Critique is divided into a “Doctrine of Elements” that constitutes the bulk of the
text and a much shorter Doctrine of Method. Moreover, the elementary doctrine is subdivided
into the “Analytic” and the “Dialectic”.
Kant explicitly states the task of the Analytic, that is, “The distinction of the doctrine of
happiness from the doctrine of morals” (5:92). Kant does so, as we shall see, by starting from
the establishment of the principle of the moral law, proceeding to the concepts of the object of
practical reason, i.e., the moral good and evil, and finally going to the senses or how rational
agents perceive the effect of their recognition of the authority of this moral principle.
The Dialectic introduces the concept of the highest good, i.e. the idea of a final end of
human moral conduct and exposes the antinomy of pure practical reason. It does, however, as
Kant reminds us, build up on what had been accomplished by reaching the stance of the solution
of the third antinomy in the first Critique:
"[T]o investigate this illusion – whence it arises and how it can be removed – (…) can be
done only through a complete critical examination of the whole pure faculty of reason;
thus the antinomy of pure reason, which becomes evident in its dialectic, is, in fact, the
most beneficial error into which human reason could ever have fallen, inasmuch as it
finally drives us to search for the key to escape from this labyrinth; and when this key is
found, it further discovers what we did not seek and yet need, namely a view into a higher,
immutable order of things in which we already are and in which we can henceforth be
directed, by determinate precepts, to carry on our existence in accordance with the highest
vocation of reason." (5:108)
"[T]o investigate this illusion – whence it arises and how it can be removed – (…) can be
done only through a complete critical examination of the whole pure faculty of reason;
thus the antinomy of pure reason, which becomes evident in its dialectic, is, in fact, the
most beneficial error into which human reason could ever have fallen, inasmuch as it
finally drives us to search for the key to escape from this labyrinth; and when this key is
found, it further discovers what we did not seek and yet need, namely a view into a higher,
immutable order of things in which we already are and in which we can henceforth be
directed, by determinate precepts, to carry on our existence in accordance with the highest
vocation of reason." (5:108)
We shall talk about both sections in detail shortly.
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The Doctrine of Method is often taken not to play a central role in the book's
argumentation. Accordingly, most commentators have neglected this part of the Second
Critique.6 However, the doctrine of method has recently been revisited by some scholars who
see it as belonging to the very core of the project and as providing essential considerations for
a better understanding of the unity of the work as a whole.7 As Kant states at its beginning, this
second main part of the work is concerned with determining "the way in which one can provide
the laws of pure practical reason with access to the human mind and influence on its maxims,
that is, the way in which one can make objectively practical reason subjectively practical as
well." (5:151) Accordingly, Kant in this closing part of the Second Critique seems to be focused
on methodological questions concerning moral education, i.e. concerning the crucial
pedagogical aspect how to make human beings moral beings.
2.3

The Analytic of Pure Practical Reason and its Main Results
“This Analytic shows that pure reason can be practical – that is, can of itself, independently of
anything empirical, determine the will – and it does so by a fact in which pure reason in us
proves itself actually practical, namely autonomy in the principle of morality by which reason
determines the will to deeds.” (5:42)

To say that pure reason is “practical” or that it is sufficient to determine the will, means that
reason can prescribe objective practical principles that would apply universally to any agent
who as a sensuous rational being has reason and a will that is “not in itself completely in
conformity with reason” (GMS, 4:413), as it is “not by its nature necessarily obedient” (4:413)
Before we attempt to explain the structure and results of the Analytic, we might need to
take a step back and explain some of the most fundamental terms of Kant’s theory of moral
action.
Reason is the faculty of systematic thought.8 It does so by directing our search for the
absolute conditions of all contingent conditions or the unconditioned conditions (5:107) in
Kant's terminology. As the titles of the first two critiques suggest, there is a difference between
theoretical and practical reason, or rather: between the practical and the theoretical use of
reason (cf. 5:5, 5:15, 5:20, 5:43, 5:69, 5:120). For Reason to be practical, there must be
imperatives. These imperatives command the will to conform to reason either "hypothetically"
or "categorically" (GMS, 4:414), i.e., conditionally or unconditionally. However, the will, or
our choice of actions, is not necessarily determined by reason. A will determined by practical
reason is the will that, in acting from duty determines its decision exclusively in accordance
with and for the sake of the moral law, i.e. on the basis of the categorical imperative according
to which reason assesses the morality of its motivations for action.
Now the sequence and the announced results in the introductory quote will be unraveled
in the same sequence in which Kant introduces the three main sections of the Analytic: I.
Principles II: Concepts III: Incentives.
To say that pure reason is practical, there must be a practical principle or law and some
motive or cause (the will as directed or determined by reason) for our actions. These actions
will not be based on desire or inclinations, but rather on the practical moral principles of
Reason, and so pure reason is taken to be an efficient determining ground.
“The first question here, then, is whether pure reason of itself alone suffices to determine
the will or whether it can be a determining ground of the will only as empirically conditioned.”
6

A paradigmatic indication of this, is the omission of the “Doctrine of Method” from Beck (1984).

7 For more on this, cf. Bacin (2010) “The meaning of the Critique of Practical Reason for Moral Beings: The Doctrine

of Method of Pure Practical Reason”.
8 Beck (1960) p. 23.

16

(KpV, 5:15) Suppose the answer to the first formulation of this question is yes. This means that
reason can generate the practical principles, and reason alone, without being subject to the
empirical conditions, can motivate our actions and determine our will.
Kant starts to investigate this possibility in the first chapter of the “Analytic”. In this
chapter, entitled “On the Principles of Pure Practical Reason,” he establishes the authority of
the basic principle of morality, namely of the Categorical Imperative as “The Fundamental Law
of Pure Practical Reason” (5:31). By establishing this fundamental principle, in the form of an
imperative – “So act that the maxim of your will could always hold at the same time as a
principle in a giving of universal law” (5:30) – reason can now set the limits to its empirical
practical use. That is, it alone can motivate our actions and determine our will.
Furthermore, Kant claims that "freedom and unconditional practical law reciprocally
imply each other" (5:29). By saying this, Kant establishes two things: 1) If an agent acts from
maxims in accordance with the moral law and abstracts from his empirical or desire-based
interests, then this agent satisfies Kant's understanding of transcendental freedom, meaning,
this agent must be free in choosing his actions and not subject to the laws of nature. 2) If an
agent is endowed with free will, then the categorical imperative is the basic principle or the
principle that determines his will. That is because this agent will act from a will guided by
reason and independently of the "matter" of the maxim, being the subjective principle of action,
namely his empirical interests. Freedom and the unconditional, i.e. categorical practical law
are then, for Kant, two sides of the same coin.
After Kant establishes the relationship between the moral law and Freedom and gives it
the form of the imperative, he declares the moral law as "a fact of reason". This fact of reason
is our immediate consciousness of the moral law as the authoritative law (5:31). The content
of the fact of reason has some ambiguity and has, in fact, puzzled many scholars, for it is
sometimes being presented as the moral law itself or our consciousness of it or even the
consciousness of Freedom (5:42); however, it also has some distinguishing features. First, the
law contained in the fact of reason is an objective and imperative one that can determine our
will. "This law, though formal, has genuine content, content sufficient, at least in principle, to
deliver a verdict of permissibility or impermissibility on any maxim. It is a certain a priori
principle for determinate use in practice that makes possible the cognition of the moral status
of particular maxims."9 Unlike the content of theoretical cognition, the content of this principle
cannot come from intuition or sensible data; instead, Kain argues Kant meant for the fact of
reason to be in itself something "given" or a unique sort of data that is immediately given to us
moral beings.
Last but not least, Kant establishes the central notion of Autonomy. He claims that the
moral law is a principle of Autonomy or the only source of authority for the will (5:33). Kant
also declares the moral law to be the only ground for moral requirements. It demands all our
reasons to be based on the legislative form of one's maxims so that we become motivated by
the characteristic of this practical principle which makes it a law, without submitting to any
external authority or empirical conditions (5:27).
In the second main part of the “Analytic”, entitled “On the Concepts of an Object of Pure
Practical Reason”, Kant turns to the concept of the good. While the elementary doctrine of the
First Critique progressed from the a priori forms of sensibility to the a priori concepts of objects
and finally to the a priori principles of the understanding, and also unlike the traditional
approach of moral theorists, the “Analytic” of the Second Critique would be in the reverse of
this order. Kant's method in the second critique progresses from the basic principle or law of
pure practical reason to the object of practical reason, the good, and finally proceeds to

9

Kain (2010), p. 8.
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considering how the moral law motivates or affects sensibility or that which he calls “the moral
feeling”:
“It follows that a critique of the Analytic of reason, insofar as it is to be a practical reason (and
this is the real problem), must begin from the possibility of practical principles a priori. Only
from these could it proceed to concepts of objects of a practical reason, namely, to the concepts
of the simply good and evil, in order first to give them in keeping with those principles (for,
prior to those principles, these cannot possibly be given as good and evil by any cognitive
faculty), and only then could the last chapter conclude this part, namely the chapter about the
relation of pure practical reason to sensibility and about its necessary influence upon sensibility
to be cognized a priori, that is, about moral feeling.” (5:90)

Having established the principle of morality and the concepts of practical reason, Chapter III
entitled “On the incentives of pure practical reason,” concludes the “Analytic” with a detailed
discussion of the respect for the moral law as the moral motive. This chapter explores how
rational agents experience the feeling or effects of their recognition of the authority of the moral
law and how the principle of morality functions as a motive, considering that the moral law is
the only ground for the moral requirements.
2.4 The Dialectic of Pure Practical Reason
In his introduction to the book of the Dialectic of pure practical reason, Kant first introduces
the problem of a dialectic of pure practical reason by pointing out its similarity with the
dialectic of theoretical reason. As he does so he leads us to the concept of the highest good and
points out its central role and dignity for philosophy. Kant reminds himself and his readers that
the moral law is the determining ground of the pure will, moreover he also identifies the highest
good (summum bonum) as the total object of practical reason.
Kant reminds us that a dialectic of practical reason is no special case, for we have earlier
seen a dialectic of pure reason in its theoretical use. Although, as we shall see, the antinomy
exposed in the dialectic of pure practical reason is of a much subtler nature than those presented
in the case of theoretical reason10. Kant wants to affirm that pure reason in general, in both its
theoretical and practical use, has the natural inclination to seek the unconditioned or the totality
of conditions. An inclination or demand that reason cannot dismiss but also not achieve. This
interest, however, Kant claims, results in some errors (in fact, the most beneficial errors reason
could fall into, as we shall see, since it forces reason to critically examine its own capacity),
and the remedy for them could be said to lie in his doctrine of Transcendental Idealism (5:107).
The failure to distinguish between appearances and things in themselves results in what
Kant calls an “unavoidable illusion” (5:107). Kant reaffirms that reason can only have access
to the sensible world of appearances, and the totality of conditions it seeks can only be found
in the things in themselves. However, in its pursuit of the unconditioned, reason applies the
idea of the totality of conditions to appearances as if they were things in themselves, causing
itself to fall into a labyrinth which it (reason) can only provide the way out of. Hence, Reason
now becomes responsible for investigating this illusion, pointing us to the key of how it can be
removed, and the only way to this is through "a complete critical examination of pure reason"
(eine vollständige Kritik des ganzen reinen Vernunftvermögens”) (5:107)
Pure practical reason also seeks and generates the idea of the unconditioned totality of the
object of pure practical reason, which Kant calls the “highest good” and to which he devotes
10

For a discussion on what some commentators view as structural similarities between the antinomy of theoretical
and practical reason, see Watkins (2010).
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the whole long second main section of the Dialectic entitled “On the dialectic of pure reason
in determining the concept of the highest good” (KpV, 5:110-148).
He, however, distinguishes between the highest good as the unconditioned totality of the
object of pure practical reason, on the one hand, and the determining ground of the pure will,
which he repeatedly identifies with the moral law (5:108 f.), on the other hand. That is to say;
he distinguishes between reason in its material and formal employment in determining the
motive and the objects of the will.
In the Analytic, Kant argues at length that no object, regardless of how good this object
is, can be made the determining ground of the will, for this would lead to heteronomy, and this
should be rejected.
On the other hand, the highest good is the totality of the matter or the totality of the
object of pure practical reason. The overarching object that could be thought of as attainable as
a result of all of our actions or the final end of human actions from which all other ends could
be derived. An idea under which we conceive a moral state. To be in a world where everyone
would act according to the form of the moral law.
“Hence, though the highest good may be the whole object of a pure practical reason,
that is, of a pure will, it is not on that account to be taken as its determining ground,
and the moral law alone must be viewed as the ground for making the highest good and
its realization or promotion the object. This reminder is important in so delicate a case
as the determination of moral principles, where even the slightest misinterpretation
corrupts dispositions. For, it will have been seen from the Analytic that if one assumes
any object under the name of a good as a determining ground of the will prior to the
moral law and then derives from it the supreme practical principle, this would always
produce heteronomy and supplant the moral principle.” (5:109)
The concept of the highest good and its representation by practical reason then determine the
object of the will, however, only with having the moral law as its determining ground.
Therefore, the highest good is the realization or the result of the promotion of the moral law.
Given that it is inseparably bound up with the moral law, assuming the validity of the moral
law requires us to assume the highest good as the object of pure practical reason to be possible.
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2.5 The Composition of the Highest Good
In his introductory analysis of the concept of the highest good, Kant contends that the
highest good not only consists of virtue – “the supreme condition of whatever can even seem
to us desirable” – but also of happiness, for the former (virtue) is not “the whole and complete
good as the object of the faculty of desire of rational finite beings” (5:110). Accordingly, Kant,
in a first step distinguishes between virtue as the supreme good (das oberste Gut) – which, as
such, is the bonum supremum in the sense of a bonum originarium acting as the condition of
the goodness of any other good – and the complete and whole good (das vollendete Gut),
which, as such, is the bonum consummatum in the sense of a bonum perfectissimum, being that
good which is not part of a still bigger whole. As the supreme good, however, “is not yet, on
that account, the whole and complete good as the object of the faculty of desire of rational finite
beings”, Kant conceives of the highest good as a conditional relation between the supreme
good and the complete and whole good, inasmuch
“as virtue and happiness together constitute possession of the highest good in a person,
and happiness distributed in exact proportion to morality (as the worth of a person and
his worthiness to be happy) constitutes the highest good of a possible world, the latter
means the whole, the complete good, in which, however, virtue as the condition is
always the supreme good, since it has no further condition above it, whereas happiness
is something that, though always pleasant to the possessor of it, is not of itself absolutely
and in all respects good but always presupposes morally lawful conduct as its
condition.” (5:110 f.)
This combination, thought in the idea of the highest good, accordingly, does not suggest that
the highest good has two competing aims or ends – namely: virtue as our rational end and
happiness as our sensible end – and that, moreover, the reconciliation of both takes place
through pursuing our natural or sensible end of happiness within the limits of virtue (which
would give mere legal, though not moral behavior). This reading strongly contradicts what
Kant announces earlier when he says:“The moral law is the sole determining ground of the
pure will. But since this is merely formal (that is to say, it requires only that the form of a
maxim be universally lawgiving), it abstracts as determining ground from all matter and so
from every object of volition” (5:109). Also, since the highest good is an idea generated by
reason, the relation between its components must be a rational one and must rest solely on a
priori grounds of cognition. Moreover, the basic formulation of the moral law, inasmuch as this
law and its articulation in the categorical imperative neither concerns the possibility of realizing
the objects of moral acts nor the happiness brought about by them.
2.5.1 How could Virtue and Happiness be combined under the concept of the highest

good? Or, in Kant’s words: How can the highest good be »practically possible«?
Kant famously distinguishes two ways through which concepts could be connected to each
other in a judgment, namely either analytically or synthetically. He was clear in the Analytic
of the second critique and emphasized in the Dialectic that Virtue and Morality are two quite
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different elements of the highest good11; neither could happiness be contained in the state of
striving to be moral, as the Stoics argued, nor would one discover that in seeking his own
Happiness, he is already virtuous, as Epicurus taught. “It must instead be a synthesis of
concepts,”12 Kant declares. The only way for these elements of the highest good to be
synthesized is through a causal relation, i.e. either (a.) happiness would be the cause of virtue,
or (b.) virtue would be the cause of happiness, and only by synthetically relating these concepts
according to the category of causality as cause and effect could the highest good be
conceivable.
The first is absolutely impossible because (as was proved in the Analytic) maxims that put the
determining ground of the will in the desire for one’s happiness are not moral at all and can be
the ground of no virtue. But the second is also impossible because any practical connection of
causes and effects in the world, as a result of the determination of the will, does not depend
upon the moral dispositions (Gesinnungen) of the will but upon knowledge of the laws of nature
and the physical ability to use them for one’s purposes; consequently, no necessary connection
of happiness with virtue in the world, adequate to the highest good, can be expected from the
most meticulous observance of moral laws.” (5:113)

Therefore, both relations, prima facie turn out to be impossible. In aiming at the realization of
the highest good, striving for happiness cannot be the cause of virtue, as such aim is not a moral
motivation in the first place. Conversely, the striving for virtue cannot be the cause of
Happiness, inasmuch as man’s moral dispositions – i.e. the general character of his maxims as
expressed in an agent’s conduct 13 – are not the sole determining factor in this, rather our causal
power is restricted by the knowledge and the laws of nature and our physical ability to use them
for our purposes.
Thus, the synthetic unity of virtue and happiness cannot be possible, and consequently,
the necessary object of our will, which is inseparably bound up with the moral law, is
impossible. Reason, therefore, is now tormented between two contradictory propositions. It is
the consequence of this doxastic state which Kant refers to as ‘the antinomy of pure practical
reason’, inasmuch as (a.) the highest good is impossible as a synthetic unity of happiness and
virtue, because the synthesis of its components is impossible, while, on the other hand, (b.) the
highest good must be possible as a synthetic unity of happiness and virtue, unless the moral
law is not to be considered as disproved.

11

KpV, 5:113.
KpV, 5:111.
13 Cf. GMS, 4:435 (emphasis mine): “Now, morality is the condition under which alone a rational being can be an
end in itself, since only through this is it possible to be a lawgiving member in the kingdom of ends. Hence
morality, and humanity insofar as it is capable of morality, is that which alone has dignity. Skill and diligence in
work have a market price; wit, lively imagination and humor have a fancy price; on the other hand, fidelity in
promises and benevolence from basic principles (not from instinct) have an inner worth. Nature, as well as art,
contains nothing that, lacking these, it could put in their place; for their worth does not consist in the effects arising
from them, in the advantage and use they provide, but in dispositions [Gesinnungen] that is, in maxims of the will
that in this way are ready to manifest themselves through actions, even if success does not favor them.”
12
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Chapter 3
The Critical Resolution of the Antinomy and
The Postulates of Pure Practical Reason
3.1 The Critical Resolution of the Antinomy of Pure Practical Reason
The resolution of the antinomy of practical reason could be said to lie in showing in which
sense and under which conditions the realization of the SB is conceivable.
Like the antinomy of pure speculative reason, Kant finds his answer to this question in
distinguishing between the world of appearances from the world of things in themselves. Kant
argues that it is true that the relationship he wants to establish between virtue and happiness to
make the highest good possible, i.e., that virtue would lead to happiness cannot be found in the
world of appearances. However, this relation could be possible, through the mediation of the
author of nature, in the world of things in themselves, where the restrictions of the laws of
nature do not apply. As a result, the proposition which caused the antinomy of practical reason,
that the highest good was not possible, won’t be more than “a misinterpretation, because the
relation between appearances was held to be a relation of things in themselves to those
appearances” (5:115).
Before reconstructing the argumentation, Kant unfolds to show how the highest good
could be possible, it will be useful to first sketch how Kant sees the order of concepts, of virtue
and happiness, in this relationship in the first place.
The relationship between happiness and morality, where happiness is supposed to be in
precise proportion to virtue, has been investigated since Socrates. Kant specifically appreciates
the fact that both Epicurus and the Stoics conceive of morality as a development required by
man through his actions, they were both, according to Kant, confused in answering the
questions of how morality is possible in the first place, for they presupposed virtuous
disposition to provide the incentive for virtue, or in Kant’s words they “take the moral incentive
for a sensible impulse” (5:117).
Unlike these ancient philosophers, Kant argues that the pleasure derived from
performing a moral action (our consciousness of the determination of the faculty of desire or
satisfaction of oneself) is not what makes the act possible; rather, the determination of the will
directly by reason alone is the ground both of the moral action and of the feeling of pleasure
(resulting from the performance of the act):
“[O]nly by this way of representing things, however, can one attain what one seeks,
namely that actions be one not merely in conformity with duty (as a result of pleasant
feelings) but also from duty, which must be the true end of all moral cultivation.”
(5:117)
Hence, inclinations and the pursuit of happiness cannot produce morality, even those
inclinations which conform with duty. On the other hand, the consciousness of virtue can
produce the expectation of happiness proportional to morality as its result. This means that
happiness is considered good for morality only insofar as it is conditioned by it. “Accordingly,
22

the supreme good (as the first condition of the highest good) is morality, whereas happiness
constitutes its second element, but in such a way that it is only the morally conditioned yet
necessarily result of the former.” (5:119, my emphases)
On the relationship between virtue and happiness, Pauline Kleingeld sees that the causal
language Kant uses to describe this relationship is usually overlooked and could be viewed in
the light of including happiness in the highest good on the the ground of duty to pursue
happiness (We shall come to explain which kind of happiness and how is it a duty soon). Kant
refers to happiness, as the component of the highest good as a moral world, an “effect” or
“result” of virtue (KpV, 5:115, 119; RGV, 6:7n.), as being “caused” by virtue (KpV, 5:111,
114). These expressions suggest that happiness is indeed conceived as the end and the result of
virtuous action.”14
The possibility of this connection between happiness and morality, as Kant announced
earlier, belongs to the world of things in themselves, however, its realization requires actions
in the sensible world. Kant presents us with two sets of “actions” for the realization of the
highest good: a) those which are “immediately in our power” (5:119), which could be identified
with our striving towards moral perfection (the postulate of the immortality of the soul) and b)
the necessary presupposition presented by reason to us “as the supplement to our inability to
make the highest good possible”, which Kant articulates with the postulate of the existence of
God (5:119).
3.2 The Primacy of Pure Practical Reason
Now, before exploring in detail these actions/conditions that Kant identifies for the
realization of the highest good, it is necessary to see how Kant justifies the use of reason’s
concepts and the assertion of objects outside the realm of possible experience, without,
however, falling back into a dogmatically apologetic mode of philosophical thought.
As we have seen in the first chapter, Kant argues that a practical extension of reason is
needed and actually possible. Practical reason can go beyond the limits of experience and those
of theoretical reason and permits us to have faith in the ideas the knowledge of which was
impossible for reason in its theoretical use, although it has an interest in them.
Kant argues that reason has different interests in both its theoretical and practical use.
While the interest, i.e., “the principle that contains the condition under which alone its exercise
is promoted” (5:120) of theoretical reason consists in the cognition of all objects and principles
as well as the restriction of speculative mischief (5:121), practical reason is interested in the
determination of the will (5:120). As a result, theoretical reason is not capable of extending its
boundaries to affirm certain propositions and principles (outside the realm of experience)
which practical reason needs to pursue as its ends.
This, however, Kant argues, doesn’t mean that reason is accepting principles and
affirmations that are contradicting or that there are two conflicting interests in reason, otherwise
the condition for having reason as such is denied. In contrast, both uses belong to one and the
same reason, for Kant has already established in the Analytic that pure reason is practical
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according to the moral law, and hence, it is still pure reason that judges according to these a
priori principles.
It is then a matter of putting things in order according to the capacity of each use, or in
other words to subordinate one interest to the other instead of having the two interests “merely
juxtaposed” (5:121), and also to be clear about the interest of both uses to avoid having any
contradicting principles. The interest of theoretical reason won’t contradict that of practical
reason, if the former didn’t claim it can confirm or deny any knowledge in the world of things
in themselves. Similarly, the interest of practical reason will not contradict that of theoretical
reason if the practical reason didn’t claim knowledge of its objects since they are only
determinations of actions.
“Thus, in the union of pure speculative with pure practical reason in our cognition, the latter
has primacy, assuming that this union is not contingent and discretionary but based a priori on
reason itself and therefore necessary0” (5:121)

Kant justifies this stance by saying that we cannot expect the reverse order, i.e. for theoretical
reason to have primacy over practical reason because “all interest is ultimately practical and
even that of speculative reason is only conditional and is complete in practical use alone”
(5:121).
As a result, although some of the practical principles and propositions will not be
accessible for theoretical reason, the latter must accept them according to its own concepts, for
not only they are still being provided by pure reason, despite being handed over to its theoretical
use as an extension, but also because these judgments do not contradict with the theoretical
interest (they are just beyond its limits). The acceptance of theoretical reason to such
judgements or propositions will not, however, be as if they were cognitive or true judgements,
rather they would only be represented by theoretical reason as postulates.
3.3 What is a Postulate?
Though Kant used the term ‘postulate’ already in the First Critique, particularly in the chapter
entitled “The Postulates of Empirical Thinking in general”(CPR A 218/B 265 – A 235/B),
Kant's primary usage of the term ‘postulate’ could be found in what is often referred to in the
literature as “the moral arguments” of The Practical Postulates of God and the Immortality of
the Soul.
Kant uses the term ‘postulate’ in the Critique of Pure Reason, particularly in the chapter
entitled “The Postulates of Empirical Thinking” (A 218/B 266), in which he describes the
principles of modality, i.e., the last set of principles in his “System of all principles of pure
understanding” (A148/B187 – A 235/B 294). Unlike the other three set of principles presented
in this system, Kant doesn’t provide a proof for these principles, he only provides an
“Elucidation” (A 219/ B 266).
In the conclusion to the aforementioned chapter, Kant explains that the usage of the
term ‘postulate’, concerning the application of the modal categories to objects, is in accordance
with the practice of mathematicians. In Kant’s understanding of the Euclidean sense of
aitémata, the term ‘postulate’ can give us the knowledge about how objects are constructed in
relation to the concept, but they cannot provide us with knowledge about the nature of these
objects. Similarly, the postulates of empirical thought do not tell us about the nature of the
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object of appearances, but they can only show us how the concept is “subjectively synthetic”
(A 233/B 286f.), i.e. consists in the connection of a cognition with a determinate cognitive
power (understanding, perception, reason) as such.
“Now in mathematics a postulate is the practical proposition that contains nothing
except the synthesis through which we first give ourselves an object and generate its
concept, e.g., to describe a circle with a given line from a given point on a plane; and a
proposition of this sort cannot be proved, since the procedure that it demands is
precisely that through which we first generate the concept of such a figure. Accordingly
we can postulate the principles of modality with the very same right, since they do not
augment their concept of things in general, but rather only indicate the way in which in
general it is combined with the cognitive power.” (A 234/B 287)
As Gardner summarizes Kant’s exposition and use of the term in the Critique of Pure Reason,
a postulate is “a proposition advanced without proof, which we are invited to accept on the
basis that nothing speaks against it, and that promises to lead to results which will recommend
the proposition to us”.15
In the second Critique, however, Kant gives us different explanations for what he means
by a postulate of pure practical reason. Starting with the “Preface”, Kant warns us against
confusing his postulates with that of mathematicians, for the postulates of pure practical reason,
do not have the apodictic certainty of those of Euclid (5:11). The Euclidean postulates here are
defined as the indemonstrable propositions that postulate the possibility of an action. The object
of this action, however, was already theoretically cognized a priori and is certainly possible.16
On the other hand,
“[The postulates of pure practical reason] postulate the possibility of an object itself (God and
the immortality of the soul) from apodictic practical laws, and therefore only on behalf of a
practical reason, so that this certainty of the postulated possibility is not at all theoretical, hence
also not apodictic, i.e., it is not a necessity cognized with respect to the object but is, instead,
an assumption necessary to the subject’s observance of its objective but practical laws, hence
merely a necessary hypothesis. I could find no better expression for this subjective nevertheless
unconditional rational necessity.” (5:11, emphasis mine)

As we have seen, theoretical reason cannot provide any knowledge of the objects of the
supersensible, hence, for pure practical reason to conceive of these objects as possible, which
is a necessary condition for making the realization of the highest good possible, practical reason
needs to postulate their possibility, in accordance with its practical principles. These objects
then, could only be said to be postulated or presupposed on practical grounds as practical reason
needs but cannot have any theoretical cognition of them. Similar to a Euclidean postulate, a
practical postulate is an indemonstrable proposition, however it is “a theoretical proposition
(…) insofar as it is attached inseparably to an a priori unconditionally valid practical law”
(5:122).
Kant believes that practical postulates of God and the immortality of the soul can act as
the needed conditions, which – once postulated –, would allow the highest good to be
15
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conceivable for pure reason. In providing such arguments, Kant is believed to establish the
connection between religion and morality. In other words, Kant proposes that the belief in the
existence of God and a future life, is, for reason, the resolution of the antinomy introduced
earlier, or the way to make the highest good possible.
We will tackle the function of the postulates in detail after we discuss the so-called
moral arguments.
3.4 The Postulate of the Immortality of the Soul
Kant presents us with two conditions through which the necessary promotion of the
highest good ought to take place. This means that these two conditions must also be possible
in order for their object, i.e., the highest good to be possible. The attainment of the first of these
two conditions as the supreme good, i.e. the complete moral perfection or what Kant calls “the
holiness of the will” requires by definition that no obstacles could hinder the achievement of
complete conformity with the moral law. Kant himself admits that this state is impossible for
any rational finite being to achieve at any moment of his existence. For in the world of senses,
this will require him to overcome all his subjective desires and natural inclinations in order to
conform to the moral law, which can’t happen in a man’s lifetime.
To resolve this, Kant introduces the postulate of the immortality of the soul. Instead of
arguing that the holiness of the will could become possible in a future life, Kant insists that any
knowledge of the supersensible world is as such still not possible for a finite rational being.
However, since the attainment of holiness is both practically necessary and impossible for man
in the sensible world at one and the same time, he establishes that an endless progress towards
holiness is the real object of the will and is necessary to assume, and holiness is to be "found''
in this endless progress. This, in turn, requires that man consider himself immortal to be able
to complete this striving.
“The endless progress is, however, possible only on the presupposition of the existence and
personality of the same rational being continuing endlessly (which is called the immortality of
the soul). Hence the highest good is practically possible only on the presupposition of the
immortality of the soul, so that this, as inseparably connected with the moral law, is a postulate
of pure practical reason” (5:122)

Nevertheless, this does not mean that holiness is attainable at the end of a progress which, as
infinite, has no end. Kant explains this as follows:
“For a rational but finite being only endless progress from lower to higher stages of moral
perfection is possible. The eternal being, to whom the temporal condition is nothing, sees in
what is to us an endless series the whole of conformity with the moral law, and the holiness that
his command inflexibly requires in order to be commensurable with his justice in the share he
determines for each in the highest good is to be found whole in a single intellectual intuition of
the existence of rational beings.” (5:123)

Therefore, this nontemporal endless progress is regarded by the eternal being (God) in some
sense as the moral equivalent of the attainment of holiness and thereby fulfilling the necessary
condition for attaining the highest good; an endless progression towards holiness, however, is
practically not equivalent with actually having attained holiness.
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3.5 The Postulate of the Existence of God
Now that Kant has provided a possible state of things fulfilling the first condition to make the
highest good possible, he also tries to fulfill the second requirement, which was rendered
impossible in this world, that is, the enjoyment of happiness by finite rational beings insofar as
they have made themselves worthy of it, i.e. happiness proportioned to their morality.
But what is happiness in the first place, and can it be considered a moral good? And
how could this connection be possible? Kant defines happiness as:
“the state of a rational being in the world in the whole of whose existence everything goes
according to his wish and will, and rests, therefore, on the harmony of nature with his whole
end as well as with the essential determining ground of his will” (5:124)

The inclusion of the concept of happiness in the highest good has been viewed at least as
problematic by many commentators, if not as a failure. For some commentators, happiness is
believed to be individual happiness, and hence Kant is sometimes accused of introducing “nonmoral good” into the concept of the highest good17. On the other hand, some might argue that
Kant, in several places, holds that there is a duty – albeit an indirect one – to promote one’s
own happiness as long as it is necessary for morality (KpV, 5:93; GMS, 4:399).
In the meantime, Kant provides us with the above definition, while discussing how to
make the highest good possible, so it might be legitimate to assume he speaks of a particular
kind of happiness. The highest good is said to be the ultimate end of moral actions or “the goal
of all moral wishes” (5:115, emphasis mine), to which reason refers us to. Accordingly, the
happiness involved in this concept must be far from being conceived as the individual
happiness or the satisfaction of our empirical needs. Although when Kant talks about the
connection of the two distinct concepts in the highest good, he seems to be talking about the
virtue and happiness of one person (5:110), this position should in fact, be extended to a world
of rational beings, a moral world or a “kingdom of ends”, as he puts it in other different places
(cf. e.g. GMS, 4:439).
As rational beings, we are not only concerned with our own happiness but also
interested in the happiness of others. Seeking the happiness of others should not be viewed as
the sum of natural ends that finite beings have; it is the objective goal that virtue requires, and
therefore happiness could be said to be the result of morality (5:119).
Following the duty to realize the highest good, which Kant calls for in different places
in the second critique (5:113,114,125,129), it is, therefore, our duty not only to promote one’s
moral perfection but also to promote the happiness of others.
Different readings for defending Kant’s inclusion of happiness in the highest good were
also offered in the literature. Andrews Reath, for example, argues that the inclusion of
happiness in the highest good is limited only to the satisfaction of the morally permissible ends
(Reath 1988), which means that happiness doesn’t contradict the moral requirements. Others,
like Frederick C. Beiser, have argued that virtue alone could be regarded as less good than

17

Beck (1960), p. 242.

27

when we include happiness with it since we, after all, desire happiness.18 Both interpretations
however do not explain how happiness could be viewed as a moral good and also do not give
reasons for how this makes it a duty to promote the highest good.
Pauline Kleingeld, on the other hand, suggests a different strategy by arguing that in
the definition Kant offers for happiness in the discussion of the highest good, he is suggesting
a harmony between the agent’s end and the state of the world. Moreover, when Kant refers to
the “essential determining ground of the will” in his definition, he might intend to show that
happiness is not the satisfaction of the contingent but of the morally permissible desires. Still,
it also includes realizing their moral ends since this is the happiness of virtuous agents.
Consequently, as the morally good is the object of pure practical reason and the highest good
is the totality of this object, then the highest good could be viewed as the moral world, which
the moral agents, under the guidance of practical reason, would make possible, when this is in
their power to realize the object of their actions. What morality demands us to do is what
constitutes the components and the duties in this world: their own moral perfection as well as
the promotion of the happiness of others, which Kant repeatedly argues is a duty (KpV, 5:34–
5; GMS, 4:423).
“[The] highest good, when conceived as a moral world, is the world that moral agents would
bring into existence if their agency faced no obstacles, that is, if all moral agents were fully
virtuous and their actions would achieve their moral ends. The highest good includes happiness
because morality demands that we make the happiness of others our end, while making it a duty
on the part of others to promote ours (as part of their duty to promote the happiness of others).
Thus conceived, the idea of the highest good as comprising both virtue and happiness is defined
completely in terms of that which is morally good, that is, in terms of action under the guidance
of the moral law.”19

Moving on to the second moral argument, as we have seen earlier, man is not the cause
of the natural laws, and the principles of his will are quite independent of the laws of nature
and that of the faculty of desire. Therefore, the connection between happiness and virtue cannot
be clearly and fully established in the sensible world.
However, such a connection is needed to make the highest good possible. Hence, Kant
contends there must be a moral purposiveness or a purposive harmony of nature under which
virtue would lead to happiness. If we establish that this purposive harmony exists, there should
be a cause or an intelligent author/designer for it. “Therefore the supreme cause of nature,
insofar as it must be presupposed for the highest good, is a being that is the cause of nature by
understanding and will (hence its author), that is, God (5:125).
By postulating the existence of God, we assume there is a supreme or leading cause of
nature that is capable of what is beyond man’s limit, that is, giving efficacy to moral pursuit.
The postulate of the existence of God does not, however, provide an explanation for
how this author makes such a connection possible, for this would claim we can have knowledge
of the supersensible, which Kant repeatedly denied. However, Kant argues that to postulate the
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existence of this intelligible author or this moral purposiveness to exist (only on practical
grounds) is a necessity, a need connected with the duty to promote the possibility of the highest
good (5:125, 5:133).
The necessity of postulating the postulate of God (and also that of immortality) is a
subjective practical necessity, not an objective duty, i.e., it is not cognized in relation to the
actuality of the object. This means that we are not assuming the existence of this intelligible
being per se (or the existence of anything, including a special kind of soul, in the case of the
first postulate), but we are assuming that ‘we’ as rational beings need to assume the existence
of an author of nature out of the duty to make the highest good possible. It is our action of
believing, as rational moral agents, in such existence, to make the highest good possible that is
demanded from us by the moral law. This belief, then has the criterion of being rational and
also has a motive for it, i.e., the realization of the highest good.
“What belongs to duty here is only the striving to produce and promote the highest good in the
world, the possibility of which can therefore be postulated, while our reason finds this thinkable
only on the presupposition of a supreme intelligence; to assume the existence of this supreme
intelligence is thus connected with the consciousness of our duty, although this assumption
itself belongs to theoretical reason; with respect to theoretical reason alone, as a ground of
explanation, it can be called a hypothesis; but in relation to the intelligibility of an object given
us by the moral law (the highest good), and consequently if a need for practical purposes, it can
be called belief, and, indeed, a pure rational belief, since pure reason alone (in its theoretical as
well as in its practical use) is the source from which it springs.” (5:126)

Moreover, assuming this purposive harmony that would allow for the highest good to
become possible requires man’s moral striving through his actions. Nevertheless, man would
never know how his actions contribute to the attainment of this world order. He can only know
his duty and his end and strives to achieve it to his best knowledge. “The moral law commands
me to make the highest possible good in a world the final object of all my conduct. But I cannot
hope to produce this except by the harmony of my will with that of a holy and beneficent author
of the world” (5:129).
Differently from what L.W. Beck suggests, namely that it is not man’s task to strive to
realize the second condition of the highest good but it’s only the task of God,20 Kant in the
previous quote and in the continuation of the passage it is located in seems to declare that the
connection between happiness and virtue is a result of the possible cooperation between the
purposiveness of free human action and the will of God. To be able to think of this harmony as
possible, and despite man’s limitation to establish such connection on his own, he needs to
postulate 1) the necessity of his moral striving and 2) the belief in the existence of God.
Now, due to the postulates, Kant believes that the concepts that were problematic to
theoretical reason, that of the immortality of the soul, freedom, and the existence of god, could
have “objective reality” (5:132), but how is such claim possible if we know these objects are
beyond the limits of our experience?
First and foremost, when we say that a concept has objective reality, it means that this
concept has determinate representational content that relates it to (really possible) objects (cf.
20
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A 155/ B 194). However, this latter sort of connection is not possible in the case of the
postulates of practical reason, for here, we are concerned with the existence of supersensible
objects, and any reference to them is beyond the limits of theoretical reason. Kant has been
clear about this in several places in the second critique (5:135 f.) and particularly in the First
Critique when he writes:
“This use of the transcendental idea would already be overstepping the boundaries of its
vocation and its permissibility... This latter is a mere fiction, through which we encompass and
realize the manifold of our idea in an ideal, as a particular being; for this we have no warrant,
not even for directly assuming the possibility of such a hypothesis” (A 580/ B 608)

Kant’s statement that objects are ‘given’ by means of the postulates could be read as saying
only that “the practical point of view must represent its representations as having objective
reality, not that there really exist objects conforming to the representations.”21
Moreover, Kant himself concludes that “this extension of theoretical reason is no
extension of speculation, that is, no positive use can now be made of it for theoretical
purposes.” (5:134) and then resorts to asserting the logical possibility of the highest good and
its grounds based on the principle of non-contradiction, when he writes: “The above three ideas
of speculative reason are in themselves still not cognitions; nevertheless they are (transcendent)
thoughts in which there is nothing impossible” (5:135). This assertion actually leaves us with
the question of why the postulation of the actual existence of the conditions of the possibility
of the highest good is even needed if the highest good itself could be conceived as possible,
insofar as it is not a self-contradictory concept?
As we have seen, the necessity of postulating the postulates is a subjective practical
necessity (5:146) and not one that is cognized in relation to the actuality of the object. In his
introductory remarks on the concept of a postulate of pure practical reason, Kant makes it clear
that it is not a necessity cognized with respect to the object but is, instead, an assumption
necessary with respect to the subject’s observance of its objective but practical laws of reason,
hence merely a necessary hypothesis” (5:11). The postulates then, are the ‘necessary
assumptions’ through which we as rational beings unify the concepts of God, freedom and
immortality under the concept of the highest good, as the object of our will. The practical
extension of our cognition takes place ‘only for practical purposes’ and these metaphysical
ideas have reality only from a practical point of view.
On the most basic level, our self-understanding as moral beings who have moral duties
requires us to commit to certain acts. As moral agents, we believe that our commitment to the
attainment of the object of our will, through our actions, according to the moral law, shall make
the highest good possible. Suppose our powers were sufficient to achieve our ends. In that case,
this implies that the highest good could only be brought about through moral action, with he
moral law as its supreme condition. The postulates could then be conceived as the conditions
presupposed for the performance of the necessary actions for the attainment of the object of
my will. Such conditions, if believed in, they will make certain acts possible – and thus become
21
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practically real in their realization – which would not be possible were the believe in them not
there. They only have an effect on conviction insofar as we are aware of our nature as moral
beings. For example, conceiving myself as a moral being requires me to have a particular vision
of the world, one that is purposively structured. This directs me, as a rational moral agent, to
presuppose an author for this purposiveness. This reading, in fact, paves the way to understand
the propositional attitude Kant assigns to the practical postulates as 'beliefs.' For the rationality
of the belief in these postulates will be in line with one’s rational efforts to make sense of the
world based on his moral commitments.
We shall get into more details about this belief state in the following chapter.
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Chapter 4
Practical Rational Belief
As we have seen, Kant has attributed an epistemic mode to the postulates of pure practical
reason, referred to as "practical, rational belief." In assigning this mode, Kant argues from "a
need" of pure practical reason to the objective reality of the conditions of its object (5:134).
This move has been viewed by many as problematic.22 Not only because some view Kant as
bringing back the ideas of speculative metaphysics without sufficient justification but also
because there are many ambiguities around the features Kant ascribes to this belief.
Kant’s remarks on moral belief in general (Glaube)23, however are very central to his
whole system though difficult to find. They are scattered throughout his writings and are often
surrounded by ambiguity. Belief, for Kant, has a very personal/subjective character or nature
which is hard to capture in the language of critical philosophy or abstract philosophizing. This
is far from saying that Kant presented belief in any "mystical" or "irrational" way, though he
was aware of this side.
When Kant talks about Glaube, i.e. belief or moral faith, he tries to provide a 'rational'
account of what this is, in alignment with his primary objective to define the capabilities and
limitations of reason. That is to say that Kant's account of rational belief, though it has nonepistemic value, makes it possible for rational moral agents to assent to propositions that enable
them to avoid any practical incoherence as they engage in their moral duty.
4.1 The Right to Argue from a Need
Although Kant established that the postulates provide objective reality to the propositions of
the soul's immortality and God's existence, he also makes it clear that this reality has limited
validity, i.e., it is only for practical purposes or the use of practical reason. This means that the
moral proofs do not provide any knowledge of such objects or determine anything from the
theoretical point of view. A need for pure practical reason, however, is what makes the agent
postulate such objects.
“[A] need of pure practical reason is based on a duty, that of making something (the highest
good) the object of my will so as to promote it with all my powers; and thus I must suppose its
possibility and so too the conditions for this, namely God, freedom, and immortality, because I
cannot prove these by my speculative reason, although I can also not refute them.” (5:142)
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The moral law, as we have heard repeatedly, is apodictically certain, which means it does not
need a theoretical opinion to prove it is true/possible; however, the subjective effect of such
law on our moral pursuit of promoting the highest good, as the object of the pure practical
reason, demands from us that we view the highest good as possible, to believe it is attainable
through the commitment to determinate actions. Otherwise, practical reason would be seeking
an impossible object, and that would be an irrational pursuit. As a result, the need to postulate
the conditions that make the highest good possible, the immortality of the soul, and the
existence of God are necessary from a practical point of view, i.e. for the sake of performing
certain acts that would otherwise be impossible to conceive of and to perform.
"[G]ranted that the pure moral law inflexibly binds everyone as a command (not as a rule of
prudence), the upright man may well say: I will that there be a God, that my existence in this
world be also an existence in a pure world of the understanding beyond natural connections,
and finally that my duration be endless; I stand by this, without paying attention to
rationalizations, however little I may be able to answer them or to oppose them with others
more plausible, and I will not let this belief be taken from me; for this is the only case in which
my interest, because I may not give up anything of it, unavoidably determines my judgment.”
(5:143)

To avoid any confusion, Kant emphasizes that the promotion of the highest good is a practical
objective commanded by practical reason. It is a duty. From this duty emerges “a need having
the force of law to assume something without which that cannot happen which one ought to set
unfailingly as the aim of one’s conduct” (KpV, 5:5), i.e. the rational need to assume both the
possibility of the highest good and of its conditions, i.e. the existence of “God, Freedom and
Immortality” (KpV, 5:142).
Kant thus clarifies that there is no command, but rather a rational need to believe in the
conditions that make the highest good possible, “as a belief that is commanded is an absurdity”
(KpV, 5:144). It is, however, a theoretical choice for us to believe in them the way presented
earlier, according to which there is an exact harmony of the realm of nature with the realm of
morals, and that there is an author of this harmony. The ground for the rational possibility of
this choice is due to the fact that any objections raised vis à vis the ontological commitments
of these moral arguments, any claim of the impossibility of such propositions would be as well
springing from a subjective belief that there is no such connection and author (5:145).
Theoretical reason cannot prove that there is no such author or that this harmony is impossible.
This might perhaps prompt the thought that there is no need for these particular postulates, i.e.,
to postulate the existence of God and the immortality of the soul, as long as I can believe in
any other procedure that makes the highest good possible. What ultimately matters according
to this reading, is not to deny the possibility of the object of pure practical reason.
Now, since the promotion of the highest good, and consequently the supposition of its
possibility, is an objective, practical necessity, however, the way in which we would think this
possibility depends on our choice:
“[I]t follows that the principle that determines our judgment about it, though it is
subjective as a need, is yet, as the means of promoting what is objectively (practically)
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necessary, the ground of a maxim of assent for moral purposes, that is, a pure practical
rational belief.” (5:146)
Pure rational belief, then, is an assent on grounds that are subjectively sufficient and needed to
satisfy a rational duty. Nevertheless, one may ask, how is this belief different from any other
belief? Moreover, how is it different from illusion?
In fact, Kant was well aware of the possible objections concerning his proposed belief
being an illusion, and he even dedicated a footnote to confront this potential counterargument.
Wizenmanns's objection to Kant's belief, criticizes the cogency of Kant’s argumentation when
he argues where he argues from the need of the immortality of the soul and the existence of
God to the reality of the object of that need. The objector simply finds it irrational and
unjustifiable to take this path, to the extent that some would see it as pathological and
illusioning in character.
But, does moral belief, in the Kantian sense, have to be viewed as illusionary and
uncritical for reason? The answer is no. If Kant's philosophy has one distinguishing
characteristic, it would be the pivotal role of reason, though, as we have seen, this is not in the
strict modern sense of neglecting everything else. However, he certainly refuses any uncritical
or unquestioned account of authorities and dogmas. We shall then have a look at the role of
reason in human desire to try to understand Kant’s reply to this.
Kant's account of reason is a very subtle one, for it is not only restricted to limiting our
irrational wishes. Kant does not deal with all desires as irrational wishes that need to be cured,
for not all desires come from our sensible nature and instincts. Reason itself, in fact, provides
us with a final moral end, i.e., the highest good, and makes it our task to pursue it through our
free action. Wood describes this capacity of reason as he says: "Reason (…) provides man with
the destination of transforming reality itself, desiring and striving for the attainment of a
rational ideal in his own person and in the world as a whole."24
In his reply to Wizenmann, Kant emphasizes this last point, when he asserts man’s
rational need to realize the moral final end due to our rational moral duty. Kant puts it as if
man would say: this is the only case in which my interest in the moral law (as a rational agent)
and the attainment of the unconditioned object of it "determine my judgment" (5:143,146).
Hence, this unconditioned object of desire is not only motivated by reason, but its pursuit is
also inescapable.
“I grant that he (Wizenmann) is perfectly correct in this, in all cases where the need is based
upon inclination, which cannot necessarily postulate the existence of its object even for the one
affected by it, much less can it contain a requirement valid for everyone, and therefore it is a
merely subjective ground of the wish. But in the present case, it is need of reason arising from
an objective determining ground of the will, namely the moral law, which necessarily binds
every rational being and therefore justifies him a priori in presupposing in nature the conditions
befitting it and makes the latter inseparable from the complete practical use of reason. It is a
duty to realize the highest good to the utmost of our capacity; therefore it must be possible;
hence it is also unavoidable for every rational being in the world to assume what is necessary
24

Wood (1970), p. 186
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for its objective possibility. The assumption is as necessary as the moral law, in relation to
which alone it is valid.” (my emphasis 5:143 n.)

The need then to have a rational commitment to believe in the existence of God and immortality
of the soul indeed comes from a personal choice to conform with the moral law through the
attainment of its unconditioned object. However, this choice is not based on an individual’s
sensuous desire that the highest good is possible; rather, we believe it is possible because we
have to, if we are to continue our rational pursuit of it. The hope that the highest good is
possible, though comforting, is not what justifies and motivates our moral belief in it; rather, it
is our rational pursuit of it that does so.
Now suppose that we can have knowledge of the supersensible and of the objects that
were rendered impossible to know in the world of phenomena. Suppose that rational
metaphysics was founded on this elevated knowledge instead of belief, what would be the
results of that?
In the last section of the dialectic of practical reason, Kant discusses the previous
suppositions and argues that if all these suppositions became possible virtue would be
impossible.
“[M]ost actions conforming to the law would be done from fear, only a few from hope,
and none at all from duty, and the moral worth of actions, on which alone in the eyes
of supreme wisdom the worth of the person and even that of the world depends, would
not exist at all. As long as human nature remains as it is, human conduct would thus be
changed into mere mechanism in which, as in a puppet show, everything would
gesticulate well but there would be no life in the figures.” (5:147)
Hence, only when our pursuit of virtue is out of respect for the moral law that we can be truly
moral in Kant’s view and we become worthy of it.
4.2 What is Belief?
“Taking something to be true, or the subjective validity of judgment has the following three
stages in relation to conviction (which at the same time is valid objectively): having an opinion,
believing, and knowing. Having an opinion is taking something to be true with the
consciousness that it is subjectively as well as objectively insufficient. If taking something to
be true is only subjectively sufficient and is at the same time held to be objectively insufficient,
then it is called believing. Finally, when taking something to be true is both subjectively and
objectively sufficient it is called knowing. Subjective sufficiency is called conviction (for
myself), objective sufficiency, certainty (for everyone) (A822/B850)

Kant distinguishes between three grades or attitudes of epistemic justification: opining
(Meinen), believing (Glauben), and knowing (Wissen). Belief is viewed as what is true only on
subjectively sufficient grounds however, it is not objectively sufficient. “Only in a practical
relation, however, can taking something that is theoretically insufficient to be true be called
believing” (A 822/B 850). Hence, we can say that if knowledge requires a kind of “epistemic
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justification” 25, or objective grounds, belief, on the other hand, is only justified in relation to
action, i.e., requires non-epistemic justification or practical grounds.
The criteria Kant uses to distinguish between the three modes, i.e., subjective and
objective sufficiency, or in particular, what Kant means by the subjectively sufficient and
objectively insufficient grounds of belief, is a debated topic.26 Although the three modes
involve assent, or what Kant calls 'holding to be true', most commentators agree that their
formulation is puzzling. Many see that Kant's description of the grounds of belief in terms of
two features (subjective sufficiency) and (objective insufficiency) contradict his claim that the
grounds of belief count as non-epistemic grounds.
For example, Andrew Chignell suggests that Kant provides two notions of subjective
sufficiency. In the first, the agent decides what qualifies for him as objectively sufficient ground
for his assent after reflecting on the propositions. At the same time, the second notion is based
on having "non-epistemic merits" for the agent as a result of assenting to certain propositions.
Such belief would play a role in the agent's effort to make sense of his pursuit of the demands
of reasons.27 This reading, however, leaves some unresolved ambiguity because Kant never
suggested he uses the notion in two ways and never state when to consider one or the other.
Thomas Höwing, on the other hand, suggests there is no actual contradiction in what
Kant attributes to belief. For him, this very same combination of the two features (the subjective
sufficiency and objective insufficiency) reflects Kant's account of non-epistemic justification.
Höwing sees that Kant's non-epistemic justification is a rational requirement grounded
on both the lack of strong epistemic support and the agent’s choice to act in a certain way. It
is the decision or the choice of the agent to act in a certain way that increases the force of such
not-so-strong propositions, and only then do the propositions in question “rationally require
the agent to form the assent in question.”28 This, for Höwing, justifies Kant assigning two
features for the ground of belief, a corresponding ground of knowledge (the subjective
sufficiency), which requires the agent to form a particular assent, and a corresponding ground
of opinion (objective insufficiency) that does not require everyone to do so. “For if we take
away the agent's decision to act in a certain way, what is left are facts that provide only
insufficient epistemic support to the assent in question. And this opens up space for possible
scenarios in which these facts are available to some other agent but fail to impose a rational
requirement on them.”29

25

Watkins and Willaschek (2010), p. 10.
Höwing (2016), p. 202
27 Chignell (2007 b), pp. 333–335; Chignell (2007 a), pp. 50–57, esp. p. 53.
28 Höwing (2016), p. 220
29 Ibid, p. 221.
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4.3 Rational Sensible Creatures
Moving back to the discussion of the postulates, Kant, as we have seen, suggested that the
essential role of the postulates of practical reason does not consist in any kind of theoretical
knowledge or duty to believe in certain objects but rather in helping us perform and fulfill our
moral duty.
“[T]he principle that determines our judgment about it, though it is subjective as a need,
is yet, as the means of promoting what is objectively (practically) necessary, the ground
of a maxim of assent for moral purposes, that is, a pure practical rational belief. This,
then, is not commanded but – being a voluntary determination of our judgment,
conducive to the moral (commanded) purpose and moreover harmonizing with the
theoretical need of reason to assume that existence and to make it the basis of the further
use of reason – it has itself arisen from the moral disposition; it can therefore often
waver even in the well-disposed but can never fall into unbelief.” (5:146)
In other words, all that the postulates of practical reason do for us is to help us form practically
effective moral intentions. However, how can this role of the postulates explain their effect on
rational agents if we know we can never have sufficient evidence of them?
In a previous section (cf. supra, 4.1), we had seen the role reason plays in controlling
and originating our desire; now we will direct our attention to understanding how our sensible
nature can contribute to morality. In other words, the answer to the above question could lie in
Kant’s view of the distinct human nature as creatures of both sensibility and reason. This view
has been present throughout Kant's theoretical and practical philosophy, but I believe the
postulates of practical reason are the actual manifestation of this claim.
Kant repeatedly says that we are rational creatures who can and must act according to
the moral law, but we do not do this through the acts of reason alone; we are still, after all,
sensible creatures. To say that reason and inclinations are two irreconcilable natures of man is
a very simplistic view of Kant's theory. Indeed, inclinations do not always point in the same
direction of our moral duty, but they can and actually sometimes do, like in the case of the
postulates. Hence, we must cultivate them when they do so and restrict them when they do not.
Kant has made it explicit that the need for the postulates arises from the limits of our
sensibility to perceive the possibility of the highest good in accordance with the laws of nature.
“I said above that in accordance with a mere course of nature in the world happiness in exact
conformity with moral worth is not to be expected and is to be held impossible, and that
therefore the possibility of the highest good on this side can be granted only on the
presupposition of a moral author of the world. I deliberately postponed the restricting of this
judgment to the subjective conditions of our reason so as not to make use of it until the manner
of its assent had been determined more closely. In fact, the impossibility referred to is merely
subjective, that is, our reason finds it impossible for it to conceive, in the mere course of nature,
a connection so exactly proportioned and so thoroughly purposive" between events occurring
in the world in accordance with such different laws, although, as with everything else in nature
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that is purposive, it nevertheless cannot prove - that is, set forth sufficiently on objective
grounds - the impossibility of it in accordance with universal laws of nature.” (5:145)

As a result, it becomes for us a subjective necessity to compensate for this inability by
introducing these ideas as the ground for the possibility of the highest good. This separation
between reason and sensibility can actually justify that although for reason, we do not have
sufficient theoretical grounds for the assertion of these postulates, they can still have an effect
on us and force their sensible incentive to action. That is to say that for any rational-sensuous
being capable of and striving to learn from experience, to be virtuous, it is not a matter of reason
alone.
Paul Guyer offers a compatible reading with this when he remarks that "just in the case
of aesthetic experience and symbols, the religious ideas can have the same subjective power to
affect human emotions and impel human actions – from the theoretical point of view, they are
illusions but from the psychological point of view they remain natural."30
Nevertheless, what makes this effect in the case of the practical postulates is the
representation of the propositions, but this should make no difference, even when the truth of
these representations cannot be confirmed by pure reason. The postulates, Guyer concludes,
"must ultimately be understood as natural products of teleological judgment that can and must
be put to work in the interest of reason to allow sensibility to cooperate with the interests of
reason."31
From the above discussion, it should be clear that despite the many objections they
faced about their need in the system, Kant's practical postulates could be seen as a point of
connection between not only his two worlds of appearances and the things in themselves, and
the use of both theoretical and practical reason but also between our sensibility and reason.

30
31

Guyer (2000), p. 367.
Ibid, p. 367.
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